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INTRODUCTION
Population ageing is one of the biggest 
structural changes currently affecting the 
development of most European welfare 
states. It poses challenges for the sustain-
ability of the welfare state in several sub-ar-
eas of social policy, including the protec-
tion of the welfare needs of the growing 
elderly population. To address the issue of 
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long-term economic sustainability driven 
by population trends, many countries have 
reformed their old-age pension systems 
and developed new elderly care policies. 
Core aims are to enable countries to meet 
the future costs of the increasing share of 
retirees and demands for a higher volume 
and quality of elderly care services (e.g., 
Ebbinghaus and Whiteside, 2012; Ebbing-
haus, 2011; Immergut et al., 2007; Mali, 
2017; Pavolini and Ranci, 2008; Rostgaard 
and Zechner, 2012). 
Since the elderly typically rely on in-
come transfers to maintain themselves 
economically and may also depend on 
care services to manage everyday life (Es-
ping-Andersen and Myles, 2006), popula-
tion ageing raises questions about the di-
vision of responsibilities. In other words, 
who should be responsible for ensuring the 
elderly’s welfare needs are covered? More 
specifically, income transfers to the elder-
ly may be public, occupational or private, 
or a combination of all three. Elderly care 
may be provided by the family, the state, 
third-sector actors or the market (Sarace-
no and Keck, 2010; Bettio and Plantenga, 
2004). With regard to care, the picture is 
further complicated by the issue of fund-
ing, which may be (partially) public even if 
care is provided by non-public actors (i.e., 
family, third sector or market actors). Some 
authors point out the shifting responsibil-
ity for welfare and withdrawal of the state 
and the expanding role for the market, the 
family and civil society (e.g. Mau, 2015). 
However, it is less clear how people view 
the welfare state’s future and its role in cov-
ering the elderly’s welfare needs.
To understand where European welfare 
states are likely to go in the decades to 
come, it is important to grasp how ordinary 
people perceive, reason about and relate 
to the structural and institutional changes 
occurring in recent decades. What are citi-
zens’ expectations with regard to protecting 
the elderly’s welfare needs in the future? 
How do they justify these expectations? 
With the help of qualitative data, this arti-
cle explores ordinary citizen’s perceptions, 
opinions and expectations concerning how 
the division of responsibility for elderly 
people’s welfare will develop in the future. 
We are particularly interested in the extent 
to which countries’ changing welfare mixes 
– i.e., the new ways in which responsibilities 
for elderly welfare are divided among dif-
ferent actors in society (Ascoli and Ranci, 
2002; Svetlik and Evers, 1993; Wintersberg-
er et al., 1987) – are in line with ordinary 
people’s ideas and values.  
A substantial body of literature demon-
strates that people’s attitudes and ideas re-
garding the future matter for explaining 
welfare state change (for an overview, see 
Svallfors, 2010). Most studies of citizens’ 
attitudes to the welfare state have been 
quantitative, relying on large-N attitude 
survey data collected using standardised 
questionnaires with answers given in fixed 
categories. While this approach’s strength 
is the broad and representative overview of 
the factors that correlate with respondents’ 
attitudes to specific issues, its main weak-
ness is the limited scope for revealing the 
reasoning and motivations behind the atti-
tudes expressed by the survey participants. 
By contrast, the primary contribution of 
the methodological approach adopted in 
this study is its ability to give insights into 
ordinary citizens’ reasoning and arguments 
about political issues, even though we are 
unable to make strong claims about the 
representativeness of the findings. A fur-
ther added value of the approach is that we 
are able to present qualitative data that are 
comparable cross-nationally, which is rare-
ly the case with such data. The data were 
obtained from group conversations organ-
ised as democratic forums or mini-publics 
held in Germany, Norway, Slovenia and 
the United Kingdom. These countries rep-
resent contrasting types of welfare mixes 
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or regimes (e.g., Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Evers and Winters-
berger, 1987). Hence, we are able to explore 
the extent to which views on welfare for 
the elderly vary across different welfare re-
gimes – social democratic (Norway), liberal 
(UK), conservative-corporatist (Germany) 
and post-socialist (Slovenia).
The paper is structured as follows. In the 
next section, we describe the key structural 
and institutional changes related to popula-
tion ageing and the provision of social pro-
tection and care for the elderly, indicating 
the important changes in responsibility of 
the state and existing differences between 
the four observed countries. Section three 
outlines empirical results from a compar-
ative analysis based on transcripts from 
democratic forums in the four countries. 
We show differences and similarities in 
reasoning and argumentation concerning 
welfare state responsibility for providing 
for older people, where expectations seem 
to be quite different regarding the future of 
the state and family as well as individual’s 
own responsibilities. In the final section, we 
summarise and discuss the main findings.
POPULATION AGEING 
AND WELFARE STATE 
RESTRUCTURING
The comparative welfare state litera-
ture demonstrates how welfare states have 
been restructured due to demographic 
changes, new social risks as well as global 
and economic influences, most notably the 
recent financial and economic crisis (Tay-
lor-Gooby et al., 2017; Hemerijck, 2013; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Farnsworth and Ir-
ving, 2011). In many countries, government 
responses to these societal challenges have 
been strongly influenced by the paradigm 
of neoliberalism, which refers to increased 
marketization, the individualisation of risks 
and responsibility for welfare, social policy 
retrenchment and an increased emphasis on 
targeted and means-tested measures (Mau, 
2015; van Kersbergen et al., 2014; Tay-
lor-Gooby, 2013). Research on the shifting 
responsibility for welfare stresses the with-
drawal of the state and an expanding role 
for the market, the family and civil society. 
Mau (2015) points out that socio-structural 
changes, in particular individualisation and 
marketization, have brought the increasing 
acceptance of inequality, along with great-
er scepticism of redistributive measures in 
the last 25 years. 
In response to population ageing, there 
have been distinct paradigm shifts in social 
policies for the elderly. One such shift is the 
change in emphasis from early retirement 
to active ageing and incentives to work lon-
ger (conversely, disincentives to exit early) 
(Boudiny, 2013; Ebbinghaus and Hofäcker, 
2013). Another important shift has been 
from state pension systems that promise to 
replace a certain level of previous income 
(known as the defined-benefit principle) to 
systems in which the contribution rate is 
fixed (aka defined-contribution pensions). 
In the latter case, the eventual benefit level 
depends on parameters including cohort life 
expectancy, the chosen age of retirement, 
and the overall amount of contributions paid 
during one’s working career. As a result, 
public old-age pensions are more uncertain 
for future generation retirees. The degree of 
uncertainty in a given country is influenced 
by factors such as the pace of demograph-
ic ageing, the size of the active population 
and the extent to which policy reforms have 
already been successfully implemented to 
address contemporary economic and demo-
graphic pressures. Modern welfare states 
differ considerably in this regard. 
Moreover, in the area of elderly care the 
different roles of the state, the market, the 
family and the civil society organisations 
across countries have led to varying levels 
of (de-/re) familialisation, i.e. the degree 
to which family is responsible for care, 
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forming specific welfare regimes (Borsen-
berger et al., 2016; Ganjour and Widmer, 
2016; Haberkern and Szydlik, 2010; Sara-
ceno and Keck, 2010; Bettio and Plantenga, 
2004; Leitner, 2003; Daly, 2002; Daly and 
Lewis, 2000). Scandinavian countries have 
over a long period seen strong de-familiali-
sation with regard to elderly care, i.e. state 
offering highly developed care institutions, 
programmes and support measures, while 
Southern European countries and Eastern 
European countries still largely depend 
on the family to take care of the elderly 
(Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008; Haberkern 
and Szydlik, 2010; Österle, 2010). In re-
cent years, austerity measures have altered 
the relationship between the state and the 
family. In many countries, the de-familial-
isation trend has halted and in others there 
are signs of a move towards re-familialisa-
tion, e.g. by subsidising domestic care or 
enabling individual choice by cash-for-care 
schemes (Ungerson, 2004; Da Roit et al., 
2007; Pavolini and Ranci, 2008; Eichler 
and Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Yeandle et al., 
2012; Deusdad et al., 2016). The increas-
ing care needs (along with tighter budget 
constraints) are responded to in numerous 
ways, including withdrawal of the state and 
a stronger role for market players as well as 
other solutions, e.g. the growing involve-
ment of migrant workers, especially in Italy 
(Shutes and Chiatti, 2012). Overall, there is 
considerable variation in the way welfare 
states have responded to the pressures of 
demographic change and economic crises. 
The differences across our selected case 
countries in the areas of old-age pensions 
and elderly care are significant. Germany 
represents the conservative corporatist re-
gime with old-age pensions coupled to oc-
cupational status and long-term care needs 
covered by mandatory public or private 
insurance. The literature has characterised 
the care system as “supported familialism” 
(Haberkern and Szydlik, 2010). Norway 
belongs to the social democratic welfare 
regime. There is a universal public old-
age pension system, which awards benefits 
based on past wage contributions and a 
poverty-preventing basic pension for indi-
viduals with low or no contributory entitle-
ments. The comprehensive public long-term 
care system is leading to a strong degree of 
de-familialisation (Leitner, 2003; Saraceno 
and Keck, 2010). Slovenia as representative 
of Central and Eastern European countries 
has a pay-as-you-go pension system based 
on past wage contributions, with set min-
imum and maximum pensions, and a less 
developed long-term care system placing a 
high degree of responsibility on the fam-
ily (Chung et al., 2018). The UK fits the 
description of a typical liberal welfare re-
gime. Individual responsibility and market 
provision play a key role in both old-age 
pensions and long-term care (Saraceno and 
Keck, 2010). 
Since the elderly are generally perceived 
as highly deserving of assistance from the 
welfare state (van Oorschot, 2000; Svall-
fors, 2010), we may anticipate that people 
will favour a strong role for the state in sup-
porting pensions and care for older people. 
Such expectations are reflected in public 
opinion surveys. For instance, in all four 
countries more than 90 per cent of respon-
dents perceive home care and institutional 
care for the elderly to be a responsibility of 
public authorities (Eurobarometer, 2007: 
66). However, people’s attitudes are also 
heavily influenced by the institutional con-
text or ‘regime socialisation’ and by differ-
ent norms and expectations regarding the 
roles of the family and the state (Ganjour 
and Widmer, 2016; Chung and Meuleman, 
2017). Thus, we are likely to find consider-
able variation in attitudes to different actors’ 
roles in the future welfare policies aimed at 
the elderly in the four countries. We expect 
people to demand more from the welfare 
state in Norway (regarding pensions as well 
as long-term care) while having lower ex-
pectations in the UK that emphasise mar-
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ket solutions and self-reliance. Germany 
and Slovenia are likely to be located in the 
middle. In Slovenia, we anticipate strong 
calls for public regulation alongside the 
continued prominent the role of the fami-
ly in elderly care, while in Germany there 
might be a greater stress on the role of the 
market as well as self-reliance, although not 
as pronounced as in the UK.
THE FUTURE PROVISION OF 
WELFARE FOR THE ELDERLY: 
VIEWS FROM DEMOCRATIC 
FORUMS
The paper relies on qualitative data col-
lected from democratic forums conducted 
in four European countries – Germany, 
Norway, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. 
The democratic forums took the form of 
two full-day sessions, including conver-
sations among ordinary citizens, who dis-
cussed what should be the welfare state’s 
future priorities, in a plenum and in smaller 
groups (breakout groups). The democratic 
forums were carried out in autumn 2015 
and may be described as mini-publics of 
3 4–37 people of different genders, ages, 
ethnicities, occupations and political orien-
tations.1 In contrast to top-down approaches 
like pre-designed surveys, structured inter-
views or focus groups, the forums represent 
a ‘bottom-up’ research strategy that allows 
an inquiry into the priorities of individuals 
with much less bias towards issues identi-
fied a priori by academic researchers. This 
enables researchers to examine the process 
of discussion and potential attitude for-
mation (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018). 
Thus, with the help of full transcripts of the 
1  In all the examined countries common recruit-
ment criteria were used and the forums included a 
broadly representative sample of the population, 
consisting of older and younger, middle and working 
class, women and men and those with and without 
dependent children, as well as some unemployed, 
self-employed, retired, ethnic minority and immigrant 
members (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018). 
forum discussions, which were coded in the 
qualitative data analysis software Nvivo11, 
we performed a systematic analysis of the 
participants’ arguments. The analysis fo-
cused on a comparison of similarities and 
differences in citizens’ attitudes and future 
expectations with regard to two dimensions 
of social protection of old people: (1) old-
age pensions; and (2) care for the elderly. 
People’s views on the future of 
pension systems
The topic of state responsibility con-
cerning old-age pensions in Germany was 
closely interwoven with a discussion of un-
conditional basic income, an idea that many 
forum participants supported as a goal for 
future policy. However, there was consider-
able uncertainty as to how that could work 
in practice. The main disagreement centred 
on the question of conditionality. Should 
the award of the basic income allowance be 
completely unconditional or should the sys-
tem incorporate some kind of recognition 
of work prior to retirement (i.e., in the form 
of an increased allowance)? The following 
two extracts illustrate how the participants 
linked the topic of income security in old 
age with the need for a state-funded basic 
income: 
It’s a matter of the taxes necessary to 
support the system going forward, and 
that many people don’t have the income 
to be able to pay into the system in the 
first place. One possibility is that you 
have a basic retirement support income 
for everyone who’s worked… (DE male, 
age 65+)
An unconditional basic income is the 
long-term goal because, looking at the 
current situation, it seems that we’re not 
headed toward a comprehensive public 
pension, since that can’t be financed, 
but rather the current generation bears 
both the current retirees and their own 
costs as well. This time period must be 
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subsidised by the state because, if it’s 
not, it can’t work. (DE, male, age 65+)
Against this background, in Germany 
there was also a widespread sentiment that 
private pension investments would become 
even more necessary in the future. The par-
ticipants did not seem to believe that the 
state alone could manage to provide ade-
quate pensions in the future. As far as the 
welfare mix is concerned, the market would 
play a more prominent role as a provider 
of retirement income and, thus, individu-
als would have to take a greater degree of 
responsibility for their own income in old 
age. It should be noted that these statements 
expressed what people expected rather than 
their actual preferences if able to choose 
freely. The statement below exemplifies this 
pessimistic view of future state pensions:  
People are saying that no one can live 
from this pension anymore anyway. Ev-
eryone should invest in a private retire-
ment fund and, if possible, two or three 
because who knows how bad inflation 
will become. (DE male, age 25–34)
Another observation that stands out 
from the German democratic forum is the 
distrust in the federal state’s ability to man-
age workers’ contributions responsibly. One 
discussion in the breakout groups on the 
first day illustrates this point. 
A major problem is that this is not at all 
transparent. Money is paid in, and you 
don’t know where it goes […]. The whole 
issue is opaque and therefore uncertain. 
That’s why people have so much fear in 
this regard. (DE female, 25–34)
This lack of trust in the state and the 
feeling the system is not sufficiently trans-
parent is similar to what we observe in the 
UK data. The UK pension system has un-
dergone important changes in recent years, 
with the old and new systems currently 
operating side by side.2 It is not possible to 
opt out from the new state pension, which, 
being more generous than the old basic state 
pension, provides a better safety net and 
protection against poverty. As a replace-
ment for the additional state pension, after 
2018 all employers must provide automatic 
enrolment in a workplace pension scheme. 
The discussion in the UK reflected some 
uncertainty and confusion about the new 
rules, which is not surprising given that the 
transition to the new system is still ongoing. 
Several of the UK forum participants 
wondered whether their national insurance 
contributions would lead to adequate pen-
sions when they retire. 
I actually think in maybe 25 years’ time 
there may not be a state pension for our 
generation. […] We may have to make 
our own provision. […] Because of the 
cost. [L]ittle emphasis has been put on 
state pension, it’s about you as an in-
dividual, what you’re doing, you know, 
long term. And I think that’s what’s 
going to possibly be encouraged in the 
future. (UK male, age 45–54)
Moreover, they expressed considerable 
mistrust in the state’s ability to efficiently 
and responsibly manage the large amounts 
of workers’ pension contributions paid into 
the system. Further, they lamented the lack 
of transparency and were afraid that the 
2 Depending on whether you are born before or after 6 April 1951 for men and 6 April 1953 for women, you 
are subject to a different set of pension eligibility rules. Workers born before the mentioned dates are entitled 
to the basic State Pension and generally also the earnings-related Additional State Pension (unless they have 
contracted out). Individuals born after these dates can claim the flat-rate new State Pension when they reach the 
State Pension age, while the Additional State Pension has been abolished. A full State Pension now requires 35 
years of National Insurance contributions (see https://www.gov.uk/new-state-pension).
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money would just disappear in the ‘caul-
dron’. We also recognise such views in the 
German discussion, but they were voiced 
more strongly in the UK case, as exempli-
fied by the following statement. 
Yeah, but the government doesn’t give 
us enough information. It’s very sensi-
tive, you know, giving that out. And I’d 
like to know where the money goes. We 
pay our council tax, and each year we 
get a bill come through, and it tells what 
percentage goes to where, like that, with 
the education, the pension, the NHS, just 
each, you know. (UK female, age 45–54)
Apart from a lack of confidence in the 
government, we also find another argument 
for making more investments in private 
pensions in the UK. Several statements 
hinted at the need to relieve the financial 
load on the government, giving rise to the 
suggestion that high-income earners should 
perhaps not receive the state pension. Pri-
vate pensions were seen as a solution to 
ease the burden on government spending. 
It could be more mandatory, some sort 
of policy for private pensions, to take 
the pressure off the government, so 
there’s more businesses (that) have to 
provide private pensions. (UK male, 
age 25–34)
Yet it should be noted that when the 
moderator pushed the participants to think 
about which policies they would prefer to 
see in the future rather than what they ac-
tually expected to happen, several partici-
pants argued it was necessary to continue 
some kind of state pension, at least for per-
sons who have contributed to the system. 
You’d think we’d have to [keep the state 
pension], because just because you hav-
en’t been able to save doesn’t mean you 
haven’t worked and paid into the system 
for your entire working life. (UK female, 
age 35–44)
By contrast, in Slovenia the responsibility 
and role of the state emerged as a key element 
in the participants’ ideas of the future. It was 
seen as central for guaranteeing a decent 
standard of living for the elderly. 
Let’s look at the role of the state in 
this area, care for the elderly, the state 
should take over the role of the guar-
antor, I mean in a way that it should 
guarantee each elderly person a decent 
pension. […] (SI male, 35 years old).
In short, the state should provide not only 
basic security but also care services and ad-
equate cash benefits and subsidies. It should 
fulfil several roles, such as guarantor (as the 
quote above directly illustrates), organiser, 
co-founder and redistributor (to achieve low-
er inequality). This general understanding is 
strong in Slovenia and rooted in the coun-
try’s socialist past. Despite the transition to 
a market economy, Slovenians would like 
the state not only to safeguard certain basic 
welfare benefits to marginalised groups but 
also to adopt a more all-encompassing role 
of responsibility for the well-being of its 
citizens. One may argue that this descrip-
tion would fit the Norwegian welfare state 
as well, but there was a clear difference in 
discourse. Notably, Slovenia was the country 
in which the participants voiced the strongest 
complaints about the current public pension 
system’s level of generosity. 
You need to work because your pension 
is too low, that’s right. […] You see, 
pensions have actually been lowered so 
much from 2000, from the beginning of 
1 January onwards, that the elderly are 
forced to work, actually, because they 
cannot survive... (SI female, age 59)
Moreover, as the following statements 
illustrate, some participants expressed 
fears that public pensions would be less 
generous or even disappear in the future, 
which was a relatively common concern 
in all countries. 
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Pensions will not be paid, because no-
body will contribute into the fund. (SI 
female, age 36)
For us, it’s not even certain that we’ll 
live to receive them. (SI female, age 38)
The discontent and pessimism related to 
the current and future levels of public pen-
sions led to quite vocal calls for a minimum 
guaranteed pension. 
Start with the pensions. To have a guar-
anteed minimum pension. (SI female, 
age 44) 
[T]his is now rapidly getting worse, in 
general, those who retired much earli-
er have a normal pension and it makes 
a bit of a difference, every next per-
son retiring now is worse off. […] For 
those coming now, it’ll only get worse 
and worse. That’s not fair. (SI female, 
age 59)
Reasons for a guaranteed minimum 
pension sufficient to ensure an adequate 
living standard included poverty preven-
tion, increased consumption, which would 
help the economy, and better health among 
the elderly. 
[…] basically, if we had this minimum 
guaranteed pension, then the poorest 
pensioners […], they wouldn’t need to 
do additional work to survive, I don’t 
know, usually there’s also undeclared 
work, pensioners need to go […] to 
be cleaners and such, so they survive. 
Then there’d be fewer pensioners slip-
ping below the poverty threshold and 
that would be positive, because they’d 
be, they’d be able to afford better food, 
more quality […]. (SI female, age 44)
Also in Slovenia, there was mention of 
the need to take some individual respon-
sibility for one’s own retirement income, 
therefore seeing private pensions as a pos-
sible solution. However, several participants 
questioned the extent to which one could 
realistically expect individuals with a low 
income to pay additional, private pension 
contributions.
One more thing, right. We’d probably 
also need to save something ourselves. 
[…] Absolutely. The state will never be 
able to do absolutely everything. (SI 
male, age 67) 
[…] The other thing is additional pen-
sion insurance, which some are paying 
into pillar pension schemes, or make 
savings, investment savings, or some-
thing – it’s something those with a high 
income are able to afford. And they will 
have more to draw on. […] But some-
one on a minimum wage could not put 
anything aside to make extra savings. 
(SI female, age 49)
Moreover, the lack of transparency in 
the management of private pension funds 
was considered a problem and made some 
participants afraid their private contribu-
tions would not be managed in a respon-
sible and efficient way. This reluctance to 
embrace private pension savings distin-
guishes the Slovenian discussions from the 
other countries. 
It’s the state, the state that should over-
see these funds, madam, not the insur-
ance company. (SI male, age 67) 
For example, I don’t trust the Blue in-
surance company at all. (SI female, 
age 47)
Unlike the three other countries, in 
Norway much of the discussion on old-age 
pensions centred on the questions of the 
retirement age and how long people should 
be expected to work in the future. Making 
people retire later was the main policy pri-
ority in response to population ageing. With 
regard to burden-sharing and the issue of 
who should be responsible for ensuring 
an adequate income in old age, there was 
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quite a strong emphasis on the need to take 
greater individual responsibility for one’s 
retirement income. 
We identify two rationales underlying 
most of the statements in favour of more 
individual responsibility. On one hand, 
some participants seemed to think there is 
a limit to what one can reasonably expect 
from the Norwegian state which, compared 
to most other countries, takes good care of 
its residents by providing a comprehensive 
range of cash and in-kind services. Hence, 
it was reasonable to ask individuals to take 
greater responsibility for their own income 
security in old age to alleviate the burden 
on the state. As opposed to what we have 
seen in the other countries, this discourse 
did not have distrust in the state’s current 
or future ability to manage pensions as its 
main motivation. 
You cannot put all of the responsibility 
onto the state and say that we don’t be-
lieve people are capable of saving for 
themselves, so we will save for them. 
(NO female, age 44)
Save privately too. […] Who is respon-
sible for your life? Is it you or is it the 
state? It is an awful lot that the state 
should take responsibility for. (NO fe-
male, age 44)
Moreover, several statements pointed 
to the need for more private investments 
owing to the increased financial pressures 
on the state and the necessity to reduce 
the generosity of public pensions due to an 
ageing population. This logic was similar 
to that identified in the German and UK 
data. The following statements illustrate 
the widespread belief that the current level 
of state pension benefits would be difficult 
to maintain. 
I don’t think one has taken enough re-
sponsibility in respect of saving for the 
future. [W]e don’t think of these things 
because it is such a long time ahead, 
right? But the whole point is that a sys-
tem like this could change rather dras-
tically, and we have to change the pen-
sion system rather drastically, because 
we can’t afford it. Then it is even more 
important […] to secure your own old 
age. (NO female, age 44)
In the Norwegian case, there was a strik-
ing absence of arguments that explicitly ar-
ticulated a stronger state responsibility for 
basic or minimum old-age pension benefits. 
Obviously, it is impossible to state with cer-
tainty why particular views were not voiced 
in the discussions. In our view, one plausible 
interpretation is that the participants took for 
granted that there would be continued state 
involvement in this regard. Opinions might 
differ more strongly concerning the use of 
means-testing to target public old-age pen-
sions only to those who need it the most rath-
er than giving everyone access to the public 
system, as is currently the case. However, 
since Norwegians generally have a high de-
gree of trust in the state, they typically do 
not see state involvement as a problem per se. 
People’s views on the future of 
elderly care
In this section, we focus on the attitudes 
to care for the elderly – an issue most prom-
inent in the Slovenian case. Elderly care 
was less discussed in the UK, Germany 
and Norway. 
In Slovenia, the family is the main pro-
vider of elderly care, and there is a tradition 
of institutional care (Mali, 2010; Hlebec et 
al., 2012; Filipovič Hrast et al., 2014). This 
was reflected in discussions, which revolved 
around the poor accessibility and high cost 
of institutional care for the elderly. The most 
commonly proposed solution for this was 
to increase pensions, in particular the mini-
mum pensions, indirectly suggesting that it 
should be the state’s responsibility to make 
care for the elderly more accessible.
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[T]he home for the elderly costs EUR 
1,500 for people who are chained 
to the bed. I think that is the price. 
So, the person should receive a EUR 
1,500 pension, end of story. (SI male, 
age 44)
Care is framed as an individual social 
(normative) right underpinned by the view 
of old people are as deserving given their 
past contribution to society. Thus, the state 
is responsible for guaranteeing these rights. 
If one is active for 40 years, or not due 
to incapacity to work or whatever other 
reason, but contributes in a certain way 
and there is so much money involved 
here that access to a home for the el-
derly should not be an issue. But it is. 
And that’s what worries me. […] I think 
our government should be ashamed of 
itself. (SI male, age 44)
Beyond decent pensions or subsidies that 
make the purchase of care for poor elderly 
affordable, the state’s responsibilities should 
also include the organisation of home-care 
services, and even socialising to ensure the 
social inclusion of the elderly, as the follow-
ing quote illustrates: 
That’s why the state needs to visit them 
(the elderly) and check up on them every 
5 years. (SI male, age 45)
Even though the state should assume the 
main responsibility for care, the role of the 
family was also recognised. However, par-
ticipants frequently noted many families’ 
limited ability to offer care due to factors 
like work obligations or a lack of financial 
resources to take care of an older person. 
Also in the UK there was a perception 
that the elderly deserve access to good qual-
ity care, although this was most commonly 
linked to the individual’s responsibility to 
ensure this care. The use of housing assets 
was a commonly mentioned way of achiev-
ing this. 
And, of course, they have to sell their 
houses to pay for their own care (UK 
female, age 35–44). 
Another way to assume individual re-
sponsibility, which emerged in the UK 
discussions, was to prevent care needs by 
looking after your health. In this sense, a 
partial role of the state was recognised in 
terms of stimulating healthy behaviour, e.g., 
a sugar tax was mentioned. 
As expected based on current institu-
tional characteristics, in the UK, care was 
therefore seen chiefly as an individual re-
sponsibility, to be ensured through private 
savings and the liquidation of assets, and 
partly as a family responsibility. In this con-
text, some participants highlighted the need 
for leave from work to take care of sick or 
frail older family members. However, the 
issue was contested, since such leaves might 
interfere with the needs of employers and 
work–life balance issues. 
Why should you be paid to leave work to 
go and look after your family members 
when they are most likely going to be 
entitled to have a carer anyway? So why 
not give another person the job instead 
of you leaving your job to go and do 
another job temporarily and be paid at 
the same time. [H]ow is that fair for the 
employer? (UK female, age under 24)
In general, the discussions in the UK 
were quite different from those in the other 
countries, especially in Slovenia, indicating 
a liberal and highly individualised approach 
to welfare with much less emphasis on state 
responsibility. There was a negative percep-
tion of growing care needs, seeing this as a 
sign of a poor (and meaningless) life. Some 
participants even argued that it should be 
possible to refuse care and have the legal 
right to euthanasia. 
All it was is, erm, getting older. I would 
like to have...and this would affect the 
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figures... I would like to have the right 
to die when I want to die. And that will 
affect a lot of people, ‘cos it would save 
a lot of money on care, on the NHS, it 
would save a lot of money, and a lot of 
people would like to have the right to die 
when they choose. Without somebody 
being prosecuted for assisting your […]. 
(UK female, age 45–54)
A little controversial, but you could le-
galise assisted suicide for people who 
think, well, I’ve had a good innings, I’m 
85, I don’t want to be here anymore. (UK 
male, age 25–34)
Discussions in Germany also recognised 
the family as an important actor in elderly 
care, similarly as in Slovenia, through ei-
ther actually doing the care work or aiding 
in paying for formal care provisions, such 
as care homes, where the issue of the af-
fordability of care was mentioned. At the 
same time, participants criticised the ab-
sence of the family, seeing it as a negative 
trend in society.
And from the human perspective, I think 
every parent normally would give and 
do anything for their child, and when 
then in old age you’re left totally alone 
and your children don’t look after you, 
I think that is unbearably sad, in addi-
tion to the financial burden on top of 
everything else. It used to be different, 
when everyone cared for everyone else, 
maybe 20 years ago. That’s not so long 
ago. (DE female, age 33)
In Germany, individual responsibility 
was evident in discussions on private care 
insurance as an addition to state funding, 
yet there was no agreement among the 
participants on whether payment of this 
insurance, similar to tax payments, should 
be earnings-related. Overall, nursing care 
was primarily seen as a state responsibil-
ity. The state’s role was therefore empha-
sised with regard to the financing of care. 
Further, the diminishing role of family 
care was seen as one reason for the state’s 
increased responsibility in providing or 
paying for care. 
(…) the state will encounter certain 
limits, because more institutions will be 
needed, because the family is not in a 
position to care for these older people 
because of the living situation or if the 
family doesn’t live here in Berlin but far 
away, or why should I quit my job in or-
der to care for my mother or whatever. 
These are different conditions, different 
social requirements we have today, and 
it’s a question of how elderly people find 
themselves cared for and attended to. 
(DE female, age 66)
Interestingly, the notion of the state in-
creasingly taking over the provision of care 
was perceived as a double-edged sword. 
The state has assumed many tasks that were 
once taken care of by the family, reducing 
the demands on the latter. However, may-
be something is being lost along the way 
in terms of within-family intergenerational 
solidarity. 
I think it’s a problem that people don’t 
need children anymore. That has to 
do with distribution and old age care, 
nursing care, pension…when you look 
at China, […] in the little villages, they 
know that they’re dependent on their 
family, that they take care of me, and 
the children grow up with this belief, so 
that is a question – whether the state 
is taking something away from us by 
taking care of us, because people don’t 
need children anymore. It’s too stress-
ful, it’s hard to balance it with work. 
I don’t need them for old-age security 
and care. It used to be that the family 
was your old-age security, and that has 
been removed by this social welfare 
system. It’s no longer necessary. (DE 
female, age 29)
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In both Germany and Norway, the pref-
erence for an increased role for the family 
was articulated, for instance, through the 
idea of multigenerational households, pro-
posed as a solution for the growing care 
needs also in relation to childcare. 
I think the support of multigenerational 
households is always a very good thing 
because then you can also address the 
nursing care issues when you have 
multigenerational households. If many 
generations live in one household, you 
can support or provide for more living 
space, then maybe it would be nicer 
to have the grandchildren take care of 
their grandmother rather than someone 
else (DE male, age 55).
In Norway, overall, much of the discus-
sion centred on how the government could 
take less responsibility than it does today. 
A liberal market perspective was present 
among the Norwegian participants, con-
trasting especially with Slovenian attitudes. 
The Norwegians showed signs of a mar-
ket-oriented reasoning that underscored the 
cost of social welfare and that someone has 
to bear these costs. To some extent, every-
body should be responsible for his or her 
own life, not the state. In the discussions, 
the main argument for the state taking less 
responsibility was the belief the welfare 
state will not manage the economic cost. 
I don’t believe society will be able to 
meet the requirements we are facing. 
(NO female, age 70) 
The importance of the family was also 
recognised in Norway. There was a per-
ception that family members and friends 
give the best care – better than what the 
government can provide – and they offer 
a more realistic solution given the current 
challenges to welfare state sustainability. 
In this regard, there were parallels to the 
discussions in Germany.    
[W]hat I mean is we here in Norway, 
we aren’t that extended family that you 
find in other cultures. We have sort of 
made the responsibility of caring for the 
elders public, and the government will 
never be as caring as the family and 
friends. It is really sad, but it is a reality. 
If we push care over onto the govern-
ment, the government will answer ‘This 
is the care you get for your money’ and 
they would rather use it for health and 
prioritising and such. The public can 
never give as good care as we can do as 
family and friends. It’s just the reality. 
(NO male, age 34)
Contrary to Slovenia for example, in 
Norway the market was seen an acceptable 
solution with respect to future care issues, 
albeit complementing more than replacing 
the state. One possible reason for this diver-
gence is the focus on individual responsi-
bility we found in Norway. Therefore, this 
was more similar to the UK discussions, 
although in the UK paying for care in the 
market was perceived as paramount. 
CONCLUSION  
This article has addressed people’s 
views and perceptions regarding the future 
of welfare policies for the elderly, focusing 
on the welfare mix in four countries that 
represent different welfare state and care 
regimes. The results of the article therefore 
shed light on how people under different 
institutional arrangements understand fu-
ture developments regarding the provision 
of welfare for the elderly. The findings ac-
centuate some expected differences and 
show some interesting similarities among 
the four countries observed – the UK, Nor-
way, Germany and Slovenia.
Given the qualitative nature of the data 
and methods used in this study, we do not 
make any strong claims about the generalis-
ability of the findings. The samples in each 
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country were based on common recruitment 
criteria and included a diverse group of peo-
ple to capture a variety of opinions, likely 
to reflect to some degree the population at 
large. Yet, the sample sizes were too small 
and individual variation too large to allow 
for the use of quantitative methods with a 
view to performing stringent hypothesis 
formulation and testing. Especially in larg-
er countries, like Germany and the United 
Kingdom, it may have affected the findings 
that the forum participants were recruited 
from the same, geographical setting. More-
over, the views expressed by the participants 
tended to reflect their expectations and 
views about future policies more than what 
they actually wished that institutions would 
be like. A common feature of the forum dis-
cussions across the four countries was that 
these views and expectations were clearly 
rooted in and shaped by the past and current 
institutional and economic context. Thus, 
only to some degree the data offer insights 
into people’s policy preferences. Nonethe-
less, the democratic forums have improved 
our understanding of how institutions shape 
citizens’ expectations of future state welfare 
for the elderly and their reasoning related 
to these. The data also reveal interesting 
cross-country differences and similarities 
in citizen’s expectations. Further research 
should assess potential explanations and 
political and social implications of these 
cross-national patterns. 
As expected, the current institutional 
settings were reflected in the views of the 
forum participants, which, despite being 
future-oriented draw from their current 
experiences and institutional settings. Con-
sequently, the role of the market was most 
pronounced in the UK, but also quite strong 
in Germany and Norway. In the latter case, 
we had anticipated a stronger emphasis on 
the state. Instead, it appears that the set-
ting of limits on state responsibility was 
more often discussed in the context of the 
Norwegian system, in which people were 
used to the state assuming considerable 
responsibility for welfare policies for old 
people. Interestingly, in Norway the par-
ticipants’ future preferences were in the 
direction of less state responsibility and a 
stronger role for the family as a solution 
in a highly individualistic society, where 
the welfare state has long promoted labour 
market participation over traditional fam-
ily obligations. Hence, increasing family 
responsibility or familialism in elderly care 
was not perceived by the participants as a 
negative trend or a consequence of austerity 
measures, but as something that had been 
forgotten in a society in which the state has 
assumed a comprehensive role in giving ac-
cess to formal care. 
A partly similar discussion was found 
in Germany where the lack of family care 
was seen as a negative trend and some-
thing that should perhaps be more stimu-
lated, by e.g. supporting multigenerational 
households. This is in line with what Daly 
(2002) perceives as one of the ironies of 
contemporary welfare states, since “the 
welfare states are now required to call forth 
a form of solidarity, which their own prac-
tice has helped to diminish” (Daly, 2002: 
260). In Slovenia, in line with the current 
system, strong state involvement was pre-
ferred in the respondents’ views, although 
the role of the family was also emphasised 
relative to elderly care. However, as elderly 
care still relies substantially on the family, 
the increased role of the state in ensuring 
access to care was seen as important, and 
the limits of family care were recognised 
and discussed. In the UK, de-familialism 
and individualism seem to be strongly in-
tegrated into people’s attitudes as a norm. 
Discussions also mentioned more radical 
solutions, even including the ‘right’ not to 
receive care, which seems consistent with 
individualistic and liberal approaches, but 
could also be linked to potentially reluc-
tant individualism (Taylor-Gooby, 2018a), 
understood as individualism due to a lack 
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of other choices. We can therefore conclude 
that current institutional settings were re-
flected in the discussions on what was ex-
pected of the welfare state in the future, 
while the welfare state’s constraints were 
recognised to different degrees across the 
countries.
In all four countries, the discussions on 
future welfare of the elderly were linked to 
sustainability issues and financing of the 
welfare state. Therefore, as expected, the 
need to contain costs in the context and af-
termath of the great recession and the in-
creasing demographic pressures was both 
acknowledged and accepted. However, this 
was more pronounced in the UK, as well as 
partly Norway and Germany. It was much 
less explicit in Slovenia, even though it fac-
es stronger demographic pressures than the 
other countries and was the one hit hardest 
by the recession (Filipovič Hrast and Rakar, 
2017; Eurostat, 2018). 
The partial withdrawal of the state ap-
peared to be expected in all countries, es-
pecially in relation to ensuring sufficient 
pensions. The future role of public pension 
provision would most likely be to provide 
a basic safety net. Slovenia is an excep-
tion here. In Slovenia, the state remained 
centre stage of the discussions, with some 
participants suggesting it should play an 
even stronger role. Overall, the state’s main 
role was to ensure sufficient means (decent 
pensions) and provide care. In Germany, 
the UK and Norway, greater emphasis was 
placed on additional individual responsi-
bility for one’s well-being and the need to 
unburden the state. Other arguments for 
the withdrawal of the state, along with the 
financial sustainability issues, seemed to be 
a distrust in the state’s management, with 
participants therefore emphasising a bigger 
role for the markets (e.g. private pensions, 
private providers of care). In this, we can 
see a reflection of the neoliberal paradigm. 
However, in Slovenia the role of the market 
was seen as suspicious. We can again per-
haps connect this to the country’s socialist 
past and distrust of capitalism, along with 
perceptions that private solutions exacer-
bate inequalities because they are not equal-
ly accessible to all. Another reason might 
be that the pressures the recession placed 
on the everyday lives of people (higher un-
employment and stagnating incomes) have 
made Slovenian more reluctant to look at 
individual and private solutions for the fu-
ture welfare of the elderly and again made 
them turn more towards the state. In the 
three other countries, it seems that the lim-
its of the welfare state were more readily 
recognised and other privately oriented, to 
a varying degree complementary, solutions 
were seen as viable and (at least to some 
extent) acceptable options for the future. 
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POREDBENA ANALIZA STAVOVA LJUDI O BUDUĆIM MJERAMA 
ZA STARIJE OSOBE
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Starenje stanovništva jedna je od najvećih strukturnih promjena koje trenutno utječu 
na razvoj svih europskih socijalnih država. Različite države se suočavaju s tim promje-
nama na različite načine. Kao odgovor na svjetsku gospodarsku krizu, mnoge su države 
reformirale svoje mirovinske sustave i način na koji odgovaraju na rastuće potrebe za skr-
bi. Te promjene znatno utječu na stavove ljudi o perspektivi socijalne države i na njihova 
očekivanja u budućnosti vezano uz buduću raspodjelu odgovornosti u pružanju skrbi za 
starije osobe. Temelj za analizu su podatci prikupljeni u poredbenom europskom projektu 
uz metodu korištenje demokratskih foruma. Stavove i očekivanja sudionika – kao i razlo-
ge i argumente koje su iznijeli – upotrijebili smo kako bismo rasvijetlili čimbenike koji 
će vjerojatno oblikovati buduće oblike skrbi za starije osobe i mjere mirovinske politike. 
Analizirali smo četiri države koje imaju različite socijalne režime – Norvešku, Sloveniju, 
Njemačku i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo – i usredotočili se na podjelu odgovornosti između 
države, tržišta i obitelji, kao i na sličnosti i razlike u prioritetima i proizlazeće argumente 
iznesene u te četiri države. 
Ključne riječi: starije osobe, socijalna država, mirovine, skrb za starije osobe.
